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Abstract
The Australian Financial Services Reform Act (2001) now requires all
registered financial planners to assess a client’s attitude towards
investment risk as an integral part of establishing a ‘reasonable’ basis
for investment advice to a client. However, the Act is silent on required
procedures or acceptable minimum standards of risk assessment.
Unfortunately, current methods for assessing a client’s attitudes
towards investment risk are mostly informal, untested and ignore such
behavioral biases as framing and other response anomalies. Unless
controlled for, these anomalies can invert risk attitude responses and
invalidate portfolio choices recommended to the client on the basis of
this risk attitude assessment. This paper examines the potential effects
of question framing on risk attitude assessments by financial planners
and explores the implications for matching risk attitudes to
standardized portfolio categories. Minimum industry standards are
recommended as a way to deal with such behavioral issues in risk
attitude assessment.

Risk Attitude Profiling: The Effects of Framing on Assessment
Validity
1. Introduction
The Financial Services Reform Act {Commonwealth of Australia, 2001} now
requires financial planners in Australia to assess a client’s investment risk attitudes or
‘risk profile’ when identifying a client’s financial objectives, situation and needs as
the ‘reasonable’ basis for subsequent investment advice. But the Act is silent on the
actual process of risk profiling, except for ‘reasonable enquiries’ based on client
provided data. This lack of guidance creates potential legal, fiduciary and procedural
problems for financial planners. If the Act merely refers to evidence of an attempt to
establish a client’s investment risk profile, then compliance is merely a matter of
documentary evidence. But if the Act implies a ‘reasonable’ level of professional
skill, competence and validity in the process, then the matter is potentially more
serious; especially since most current assessment techniques used by financial
planners are informal question and answer processes of doubtful validity, both in
terms of psychometric principles and investment theory.
One critical class of behavioral problem in risk attitude assessment is that of
‘framing’. Data collection always involves a method of ‘framing’ the questions, either
verbal or written, to elicit responses from the client. Questions may be framed in
terms of wins or losses, opportunities or threats, positive or negative returns. A
requirement for psychometric validity is that responses to events with equivalent
outcomes should be invariant to the framing context.
But there is strong evidence that question framing does influence responses.
Alternative frames can produce complete reversals of risk attitude responses to an
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identical problem of risky investment. The development of this evidence from its
prospect theory origins can be traced in Kahneman (2003, 1998, 1999, 1979) and
Tversky (1992, 1986, 1981). Financial planners need to be aware of framing effects
and associated issues when assessing the attitudes of their clients to investment risk.
Ignoring these effects can lead to completely inaccurate assessments, invalid
interpretations and inappropriate advice on asset allocation and portfolio selection.
This paper examines the nature of framing effects on the validity of risk attitude
responses and assessments within the context of advice and recommendations on asset
allocation and portfolio selection. We argue that current practices and techniques are
often inadequate to the legislative objectives. They often contravene or ignore
principles of behavioral finance and personal psychology. In particular, they disregard
the effect of ‘framing’ on assessment validity.
The purpose of this analysis is to show that ignoring such behavioral anomalies
as question framing may invalidate responses and call into question any suggested
portfolio selections that purport to conform to a ‘reasonable basis for advice’. The
conclusions suggest that minimum industry standards of risk attitude assessment are
urgently required to ensure some validity, relevance and standardization among
current practices.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section two reviews the relevant legislative
background to mandatory risk attitude assessment and lack of guidance on assessment
procedures. Section three defines the concepts of ‘risk attitudes’ and ‘framing’ as used
in risky investment decisions and identifies the types of framing in the literature.
Sections four and five define and discuss two issues fundamental to assessment
validity. The first issue concerns how to deal with framing bias in risk profile
assessments. The second issue focuses on framing in the context of the role of risk
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attitude assessments in asset allocation advice. Section six suggests the need for
minimum industry standards to help address these issues.

2. Legislative Background to Risk Profiling
The Financial Services Reform Act (Commonwealth of Australia, 2001) is part
of a legislative regime designed to reform the Australian financial services industry.
The Act provides for (i) single licensing framework for financial service providers;
(ii) minimum standards of conduct for financial service providers dealing with retail
clients; and (iii) uniform disclosure obligations for all financial advice provided to
retail clients.
Before giving financial advice or service, all licensees and their representatives
must outline the services to be provided to the client in a Financial Services Guide.
Advisors must have a suitable basis for giving that advice and must record advice
details in a Statement of Advice to the client (Faludi, 2002).
Any financial advice given to clients must be appropriate to the client’s
objectives, financial situation and needs. The FP must make ‘reasonable’ enquiries of
the client to establish these details. Financial advice is then only deemed appropriate
and reasonable if it is made with due regard for ‘the client's objectives, financial
situation and needs’ as a reasonable basis for the advice (Sec 945A).
These ‘reasonable enquiries’ include assessment of a client’s reaction or attitude
towards, and tolerance of, investment risk. The assessment obligation is repeated in
both the Australian Financial Planning Association’s Code of Conduct (AFPA, 2003)
to its members and the Australian Securities and Insurance Commission’s Policy
Statement 175 (ASIC, 2003). The Statement outlines ASIC’s policy for administering
sections of the Financial Services Reform Act concerning conduct and disclosure.
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The Policy Statement defines a client’s relevant personal circumstances as
including their:
a. Tolerance to the risk of capital loss, especially where this is a significant
possibility if the advise is followed; and
b. Tolerance of the risk that the advice (if followed) will not produce the
expected benefits 1.
Under the FSR Act, a ‘client’s best interest’ includes psychological comfort and
well-being as well as economic optimization of portfolio returns. Financial planners
must pay due attention to a client’s beliefs, expectations and attitudes as an integral
part of ‘best interests’.
While a strict interpretation of PS 175 defines risk tolerance in terms of capital
loss, the concept more generally includes both return volatility and absolute capital
loss tolerance. The FPA adopted this latter interpretation, commenting that PS175
(ASIC, 2003) was not expansive enough about the nature of client related enquiries
about risk attitudes, especially in light of the associated investor risks.
But neither the Act nor PS175 lay down minimum requirements for risk attitude
assessments or define standard procedures for dealing with various behavioral
anomalies that complicate the risk assessment process by creating response effects
that significantly influence the validity, accuracy and consistency of risk attitude
ratings. So what are these ‘risk attitudes’ that Financial Advisors must assess?

2.1 Behavioral Dimension of investment
Markowitz portfolio theory may establish a deterministic model for optimal
asset and portfolio allocation. But it does so under a highly unrealistic set of
behavioral assumptions. For each individual client, investment decision making is
1

One item not included as yet is tolerance to levels of fees and charges by various strata of managers
within the investment industry.
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based as much on perceptions, attitudes, belief and experience as on economic
criteria. (Antonides & Van Der Sar, 1990) stress that:
“Individual investment decision making can be seen as the outcome of the
confrontation between expectations and preferences, given the restrictions imposed by the
budget and the market. Our information and beliefs determine the possible outcomes foreseen
and their subjective probabilities, and our wants or desires determine the values or utilities of
the possible outcomes…. After all, the perception of economic phenomena is governed

by psychological factors”
In a limited way, the AFSR recognises this conjunction of economic and
psychological aspects in a client’s investment decision making. The requirement for
risk profiling is essentially an exercise in attitudinal measurement that integrates
behavioral dimensions into conventional financial models by allowing for the
subjectivity of perception. Valid, reliable measurement requires conformity to
established psychometric principles of attitudinal measurement and control for
behavioral anomalies that may bias assessment.
Callan and Johnson (2002) have begun the call for minimum standards of
process conformity with basic psychometric principles in order to ensure the required
qualities of assessment outcomes such as internal validity and reliability. But the need
to control for anomalies such as framing has not been addressed directly.
Data is lacking about the how Australian financial planners current assess a
client’s risk attitudes or tolerance. Most evidence is either anecdotal, from the popular
press, industry sources or reflective experience (see, for instance, (Elsayed & Martin,
1998); (Davey, 2000) 2. This evidence indicates that few, if any, approaches are based
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In 2003, 1998 and 1995 a survey on the quality of advice by financial planners
was jointly conducted by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and
the Australian Consumers Association, but no reference is made to risk profiling or risk
attitude assessment techniques {(ASIC, February 2003)ASIC, 2003}. A forthcoming
survey of the financial services industry commissioned by the AFPA through the
University of RMIT may include some information on current practice (see AFPA
homepage at http://www.fpa.asn.au).
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on psychometrically defensible processes either in terms of behavioral data collection
principles or attitudinal measurement requirements (Callan and Johnson, 2002).
An already existing trend is for large financial service franchising companies to
develop standardized risk attitude assessment processes for distribution among their
franchise holders. There are also an expanding number of software based risk attitude
or risk preference assessment systems. While the advent of these programs reflects the
inadequate state of current practices, there is, as yet, no comparative survey of their
psychometric and construction validity 3. One exception is a software profiler by the
firm ProQuest. This firm, now Finametrica, submitted their software profiler to
psychometric validity tests with the University of New South Wales in 1999 with
positive results (ProQuest, 1999).
But there is considerable evidence of dissatisfaction from industry oversight
bodies about both the processes of risk attitude assessment and the use of those
assessments. The criticisms focus on (i) the lack of standardization of risk profiling
approaches/techniques and (ii) the validity of approaches that use assessed risk
attitudes to match and selected classes of investment portfolios categorized on their
risk-return profiles. In 2003, a voluntary committee of the Financial Planning
Association of Australia reached a consensus on a risk profiling definition but also
‘… rejected processes of choosing investments based on whether investors were risk
sensitive or risk tolerant’ (Spits, 2003).

3. Risk Attitudes

3

Some vendors have submitted their product to psychometric testing. For instances, Pro-quest (now
FinaMetrica) submitted their software to the University of New South Wales Psychology unit for
testing (ProQuest, 1999). .
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The concept of ‘risk attitude’ has proved easier to measure than define. Saucier and
Gerard (2000) note the ambiguity and lack of consensus definition in the
psychological literature since it first appeared. But they do identify recurrent themes
such as diverse dimensions (opinions, beliefs and values) of evaluations (like, dislike,
preference) about “objects” that imply alternative ideas of what is desirable (Saucier,
2000) . As applied in investment decisions, ‘attitude’ refers to the tendency to
evaluate a person or a thing or idea either favorably or unfavorably. Fishbein and
Ajzen (1975) describe attitudes as:

"Learned, relatively enduring predispositions to respond in consistently favorable or
unfavorable ways to certain people, groups, ideas or situations."
This definition emphasizes the developing nature of attitudes towards risky
investments as a system of beliefs learnt over long periods of time, their consequent
enduring nature and the involvement of feeling, beliefs and actions. Attitudes
predispose people to behave (respond) in certain consistent ways, especially in
evaluative terms. They may also play a positive facilitating role in memory-based
decision making by providing a quick alternative means of evaluating choice options
(Sanbonmatsu, and Fazio, 1990).
Generic risk tolerances are only one element in the compromise between
preferences and expectations. How attitudes then condition decision behavior is an
entirely separate question. A client may bring different, often opposite reverse risk
tolerances to bear on their actual investment decisions depending on the decision
nature and context. Generic attitudes towards investment risk are not necessarily
effective predictors of actual decision-making behavior in relation to different classes
of investment decisions.

3.1 Investment Risk
7

The concept of ‘investment risk’ refers to the possibility of capital loss and/or the
volatility of returns on an investment if the financial advice is followed. The classical
expression of investment decision-making under uncertainty defines a person’s risk
attitude as their preference between a gamble and a certain pay-off.
“…risk attitude indicates one’s preference between a gamble and the expected value
of that gamble. Risk aversion means that one prefers the expected value, while risk
seeking implies that one prefers the gamble. The definition of risk aversion, however,
does not reveal why one prefers the certain amount.” ((Chapman, 1997)
Studies into investment risk tolerance or risk attitudes are classical based on the
preferences exhibited between a gamble and the (certain) expected value of that
gamble under various contexts and levels of investment risk. Although risk attitude
scales are essentially continuous (see diagram 1), financial planners generally assess
risk preferences only in terms of broad categories. The spectrum is typically divided
into three broad categories of ‘risk averse’ ‘risk neutral’ and ‘risk seeking’ preference
rankings.
The implicit assumption here is that financial advice on portfolio selection and
asset allocation must be consistent with the client’s expressed attitude towards or
tolerance of the probability and size of capital loss and degree of volatility of
investment return. Within these parameters, valid rankings require that category
assignment is consistent with client attitudes. For instance, a valid assessment of a
client as ‘risk averse’ should be accurate, repeatable and meaningful. That is, a risk
averse profile should be (I) consistent with the client’s attitudes, (ii) invariants under
repetition for questions of identical outcomes, and (iii) have appropriate separation
value in an investment sense.
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However, there are several behavioral factors that appear to violate these rules
and invalidate categorization of clients risk attitude profiles. The issue of question
Framing is such a problem. We now examine the dynamics of framing effects on
response validity.

3.2 Framing Defined
Kahneman and Tversky (Daniel Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1986) first defined framing in its broad sense as the frame of reference
used by a decision maker when making decisions. A ‘frame’ defines the decision
maker’s conceptions as to the nature of ‘the acts, outcomes and contingencies
associated with a particular choice’ (p. 453). (A. Kuhberger, 1998) defines ‘framing’
as an subjective, internal process determined by the situation’s contextual and
individual factors.
(Evensky, 1997) emphasizes the uniqueness of individual conceptual schema.
Each decision maker constructs their own subjective conceptions about the decision
task derived from their own reality which then forms their own unique frame of
reference.
Subsequently, ‘framing’ was used to refer to the manner in which a problem or
issue is presented to the decision maker when determining their attitude towards risk.
The ‘semantic manipulation of a problem so as to re-describe exactly the same
situation.’ (A. Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 2002)
The classic approach to risk attitude assessment presents an investment decision
with two options - a dollar outcome that is certain and an equivalent gamble with
known probabilities. Risk attitude is reflected in the respondent’s choice of option
Preference for the certain outcome reflects risk aversion. Preference for the gamble
reflects risk seeking. Indifference between options represents risk neutrality. Intrinsic
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factors such as investment size, levels of initial wealth, pay-off probabilities may be
varied to reveal risk attitude patterns and sensitivity to conditioning and contextual
factors.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) first formalized the notion that how attitudes are
used in decision making is also influenced by how a particular investment decision is
formulated or ‘framed’ in the strict sense (see also Tversky, 1986, 1981, 1992). A
large body of empirical evidence now supports the proposition that the ‘framing’ of a
choice problem can reverse risk attitudes, depending on whether the problem is
framed in a positive or negative way. Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck and Perner
(2002) provide a synthesis of this empirical evidence. When a decision involving
financial uncertainty is framed in a positive light (e.g. In terms of gains) clients are
less willing to take risks than if exactly the same pay-off situation is presented in
terms of potential losses. Positive framing (gains, winning, opportunity) induces risk
aversion, while negative framing (potential losses, losing or threat) of the same
problem with equivalent pay-offs produces risk seeking attitudes.
This attitude reversal means that the form of question presentation may
condition the response. Two financial advisors may elicit completely contrary risk
attitudes from a client by presenting a problem in two opposing ‘frames’ even though
the choices have exactly equivalent pay-offs.

3.3 Framing effect on responses and rationality
A risky investment choice problem may have identical economic pay-offs, but
may elicit contradictory responses from a client depending on how the problem is
framed. In describing investors’ choice, (D. Kahneman & Riepe, 1998) assert that the
objects of attitudes and evaluations of them are not objective facts but mental
representations. Although the choice problem may appear objectively defined this is
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a false interpretation. Any choice issue is inherently contextual and can only be
viewed through the lens of individual subject interpretation. Individual responses to
uncertainty pay-off situations are formed from subjective evaluations that are strongly
influenced by attitudes. So contradictory decision choices induced by framing in
identical pay-off situations, while economically confounding, may be quite consistent
to the individual making them. In mental accounting terms, the pay-offs for that
decision may be asymmetrical depending on whether they are framed as losses or
gains. Losses may weigh more heavily than the utility or satisfaction from equivalent
gains.

3.4 Evidence contrary to framing effects
Not all studies support the framing effect conclusions. (Mandel D.R, 2001)
reexamined the assumptions underlying the classic Asian disease problem used by
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) to illustrate gain-loss formulation effects. {Mandel,
2001) argues that their reported framing effects may have been due ambiguity and
descriptor factors in the problem presentation. First for the decision maker, the
outcome ambiguity attached to a sure outcome is much less than the ambiguity
attached to a risky outcome prospect. Second, there are two distinct types of
manipulations that get entangled in the alternative problem description. The first how
the outcomes are described – positive versus negative presentations. The second
manipulation relates to the descriptors used to convey the relevant expected outcomes
(lives saved/not saved versus lives lost/not lost). {Mandel, 2001) found that
eliminating these confounding effects from the presentation of a formally equivalent
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problem resulted in no significant predictive effect of either descriptor or outcomes
frames on choice 4.

3.5 Benchmarking framing effects
Framing effects in the classic Kahneman and Tversky context are inherently
comparative. Individual responses to an investment choice problem couched in
positive terms are compared to the responses framed in negative terms. Comparative
assessments are then made in terms of sign changes (direction – risk averse versus
risk tolerant) and magnitude changes (how much more or less risk tolerant) of attitude
implied in these responses.
While this “sign reversal effect” is well evidenced in empirical studies, there is
less agreement about the size of the reversal effect. Druckman (2001) reports varying
success among replication studies, for instance, Bless et al, 1998; Fagley and Miller,
1990; Miller and Fagley, 1991; Kuhberger, 1995; 1998. For a review of evidence see
Levin et al, 199.
Druckman (2001) distinguishes two approaches towards the comparative
analysis of framing effects on risk attitude assessment. The first approach is a
unidirectional effect or choice shift. The second is bi-directional effect or choice
reversal. The first approach compares the percentage of participants choosing the risk
averse alternative (risk seeking) in the gains format with those choosing the risk
averse alternative in the losses format. A significant difference indicates a ‘framing’
effect. The standard of comparison in this approach ‘reveals just how different
preferences can be when one frame is used instead of another (objectively identical)
frame.’ (Druckman, 2001, p. 94).

4

A marginally significant framing effect was obtained when the signs for the two framing
manipulations were either either positive or negative.
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The second or bi-directional approach due to Wang (1966) uses a risk neutral 50
percent of participants standard of comparison to establish if risk-averse choices
dominate for the gains format (significantly greater than 50 percent) and risk seeking
choices dominate for the losses format. A framing effect occurs if significantly greater
than 50 percent of participants choose the risk-averse option under the ‘gains’ format
and significantly fewer than 50 percent choose the risk-averse option under the ‘loss’
format. This approach has the advantage of showing whether alternative frames cause
respondents to opt for opposite alternatives. ‘Identifying such a majority reversal in
preference can be important for those interested in if different frames can generate
majority support for one alternative instead of another’. (p. 94).
Druckman (2001) points out that each approach reveals particular insights into
framing effects. The unidirectional approach reveals the relative impact of alternative
frames on preferences while the bi-directional approach reveals the occurrence of a
majority preference reversal. However, the two approaches may give contrary results
about the existence and strength of attitude shifts under framing effects.

3.6 Frame-free Response Bench-mark
More importantly, neither approach gives any insight into the effect of framing
on latent attitudes or frame-free preferences. In real-world FP interviews, the
respondent may experience only one frame in the self-report process that may or may
not, shift their latent risk attitudes or preferences. Evaluating the effect of framing on
frame-free attitudes requires the measurement of prior risk preferences. But even then,
Wang (1996) points out that a general risk attitude propensity measure may be
inappropriate since attitudes vary considerable across specific problem domains.
The notion of frame-free response benchmarks brought a distinction between
imposed and subjective frames. (Elliott & Archibald, 1989) pointed out that studies

13

on framing effects since Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) original prospect theory
article extended analysis within an imposed frames context. They studied the
subjective frames used by respondents in choice situations to see whether subjective
framing yields the same systematically different choices observed when using
imposed frames. When comparing the predictive power of frames with that of
knowledge of risk preferences, they found a clear relationship between actual decision
choices and framing. But they found no relationship between choice behavior and
attitudes towards risk.
This distinction between risk attitudes, risk preferences and actual choice
behavior has yielded interesting results. Several studies indicate that there is no clear
relationship between an individual’s actual choice behavior and either risk preferences
or risk attitudes as assessed by financial planners. So assessment of risk attitude or
risk preferences is, at best, an uncertain guide to an individual’s actual behavior when
making investment decisions under uncertainty.

3.7 Attitudes and Decisions
A note of caution is needed on the often substantive differences between a
client’s attitudes, beliefs and opinions on the one hand and actual investment behavior
or choices on the other. Although risk attitudes may indicate preferences and
tolerances of investment risk, they can be poor predictors of a client’s actual decision
behavior. (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998) affirm that the literature has been mixed
as to how alternative framing of information in positive or negative terms actually
affects judgments and decisions.
Studies of factors determining risk preferences have also yielded interesting
framing effect results. The object of framing effects may relate to the size of
probabilities, the type and size of pay-offs or other framing conditions. (Anton
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Kuhberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, & Perner, 1999) distinguished size of probabilities
and pay-offs attached to the risky outcome option as potential factors affecting risk
attitudes. In line with existing formal theories such as prospect theory, cumulative
prospect theory, venture theory, and Markowitz's utility theory, results confirmed an
association between risk preferences and the size of payoffs, the probability levels,
and the type of good at stake (money/property versus human lives).
In general, risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses increases with
increased dollar payoffs and with higher probability levels for the gambling option.
But contrary to the predictions of these theories, it was not the size of probabilities or
payoffs, but the framing condition itself, that explains most of variance in attitudes.
{Kuhberger et al, 1999) concluded that the essence of framing could not be described
by any linear combination of predictors.
The size of effects of different framing perspectives on attitude reversal has also
been studied. (Highhouse & Yuce, 1996) conclude that different framing perspectives
produce different degrees of attitude reversal. They distinguished a ‘threat and
opportunity’ perspective from a ‘loss and gain’ perspective. The risky alternative was
perceived as an opportunity in the ‘loss’ domain, but as a threat in the ‘gain’ domain.
But the two perspectives were distinguishable in their framing effects. The framing of
a problem in a ‘threat’ versus ‘opportunities’ manner intensified the attitude reversal
relative to a ‘loss/gain’ perspective. The former frame induced greater risk taking for
opportunity-framed problems (loss) and increased risk averse for threat-framed
problems (gain). We conclude that threat and opportunity perceptions are theoretically
and empirically distinguishable from loss and gain perspectives.
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4. Effect of Framing on risk attitude assessment validity
The forgoing review indicates the pervasiveness and robustness of the attitude
reversal effect of framing in attitude assessment procedures. Two FPs may elicit
contrary risk attitudes from a client by presenting a problem in two opposing ‘frames’,
even though the choices have exactly equivalent pay-offs.
Two issues arise on the question of how to deal with, or allow for, the effect of
framing on attitude profiling. The first issue relates to the quality of assessment. The
second to how these assessments are then used as a basis for investment advice and
decision-making by the financial planner. Current practices by financial planners raise
serious criticisms on both counts in relation to the legal requirement to ‘act in the
client’s best interests’.
(Callan & Johnson, 2002) see risk tolerance as a complex attitude that requires
the use of a sophisticated and complete assessment process. The psychometric aspect
of attitude assessment concerns measurement qualities that include internal validity,
comparability, replication and accuracy. They argue for systematically developed
measures of risk tolerance with established test norms as a basis for looking at
acceptable investments appropriate to the client’s level of risk tolerance.
Psychometrically validated measurement processes then allow the financial planner to
compare the client’s level of risk tolerance with others completing the same profiling
procedure.
But there is a second issue, quite apart from the measurement issue, that
concerns the impact of other behavioral factors, such as framing, on the role of
attitudes in actual decision behavior. How we deal with ‘framing effects’ in the risk
assessment process depends our view of how framing impacts on investment decision
choices. One alternative is to treat the framing effect as an intrinsic characteristic of
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client attitudes in the sense that a client adopts a particular ‘frame’ of reference when
making identifiable types of financial decisions. For instance, a client may
consistently adopt a “loss” frame of reference or heuristic when dealing with long
term life-time savings decisions such as superannuation. But the same client may a
client may adopt a “profit” or “winning” type of decision frame as a consistent
heuristic with less significant, short-term investment decisions. This ‘consistent
heuristic’ approach focuses on identification of the heuristic framing perspective each
client adopts for specific investment decisions. The financial planner would then use
that framing perspective in the self-report questioning process to construct a risk
attitude profile appropriate for particular types of investment decisions.
A second alternative is to concentrate on the extent of framing effect deviations
away from a ‘frame-free’ benchmark. Framing bias is established by benchmarking
self-report responses against a ‘frame-neutral’ benchmark of questions. One such
approach is the ‘combination format’ of Levin, Johnson and Davis (1987) and
(Druckman, 2001) 5. They suggest the concept of a frame-neutral benchmark to
measure and eliminate framing effects - benchmark that contains both positively and
negatively framing for each question.
If the concept of ‘frame free’ attitudes is valid, then this standard of comparison
provides a way to evaluate the impact of a frame on unadulterated preferences. That
is, preferences unaffected by a particular frame. As with other attitude scales, the
measurement process involves standardizing a set of questions on a frame-free
benchmark for attitudes and then observing the shifts in attitude as a result of the
component frames.

5

See also Kuhberger 1995.
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5. Risk attitude assessment and asset allocation advice
Callan and Johnson (2002) see client risk attitude or tolerance profiling as an
attempt to bring psychological factors to bear on the issue of economic optimality. In
terms of asset allocation advice, the purpose of risk profiling is to provide an accurate
assessment of a client’s risk profile that will enable the adviser:
“to develop a tailored financial plan that better reflects the client’s perception of
the acceptable trade-off between risk and the compensation required for bearing risk.
By making the client’s risk tolerance explicit and understandable, the planner is able
to help the client identify any mismatch between psychological and financial needs,
then work with the client to make any trade-offs that might be required.” (p. 133).

5.1 Portfolio Pickers
The second area of criticism over current risk profiling practice is the use of
profiling as a disguised form of ‘portfolio picker’. Although this issue is distinct from
framing considerations, the use of risk profiling by the financial advisor will influence
how framing can adversely affect a client through inappropriate investment asset
allocations or choices. The major use of risk profiling is to map a client’s needs and
preferences into investment asset allocation advice or recommendations. But current
practices often merely uses risk profiling as a poorly disguised one step technique for
picking one of a pre-classified range of portfolios that are supposed to reflect the
client’s risk attitudes, investment preference and requirements.
This form of profiling is particularly prevalent in franchise operations. Many
large banking and insurance companies run financial planning divisions through
geographical agencies or franchises. The parent company will construct standardized
portfolios categorized in risk-return terms as either ‘conservative’, ‘balanced’ or
‘growth’ in their orientation. Licensed agents or franchisees will then either formally
or informally collect verbal, written response and documentary evidence from the
client as to their broad risk attitude profile. The profile is then matched to a
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standardized portfolio category that will then be offered to the client by the agent or
franchisee.
Smaller financial planners who operate independently will usually make their
recommendations based on similar classifications of portfolios by fund managers.
Asset allocation to tailor a portfolio to an individual client’s attitudes, preferences and
capacity then becomes a matter of blending a mix of these portfolios in each of the
asset classes.
Proquest (2001) describes this portfolio picking as a single step procedure in
which scored questionnaires about a client’s age, experience, attitudes to risk, and
time horizon are used to select one of a range of "profiles". Each risk profile is linked
with one of a limited number of pre-constructed asset allocation portfolios.
ProQuest (2001) identify five conceptual flaws that negate the validity and
appropriateness to the client of these portfolio picking procedures.
1. They ignore principles of test construction
2. Situational questions preclude assessment of risk tolerance per se.
3. No assessment of the return required to meet the client’s goals
4. No identification of any mis-match between the client’s risk tolerance and
the inherent risk in the portfolio return which may negate the
appropriateness of the chosen asset allocation.
5. No consideration of any alternative portfolios if a mis-match between the
inherent risk and risk tolerance occurs.
The major point here is that adverse framing effects are likely to be compounded
when inserted into an already fundamentally flawed risk profiling process.
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6. Framing effects and Industry Standards
Callan and Johnson stress the need for a high internal validity and reliability in
risk attitude assessment processes. Risk tolerance or attitude scores require
completeness, accuracy consistency and relevance. Lack of these measurement
qualities compromises assessment reliability and comparability and may lead to
inappropriate investment advice or recommended investment choices.

6.1 Internal decision frames
However, even more fundamental problems associated with the psychology of
investment behavior may pre-empt measurement issues. Both risk attitudes and risk
assessment processes are essentially context dependent. Just as externally imposed
frames of reference may alter a client’s risk attitude, so a client’s own framing of
decisions may affect the degree of investment risk they will tolerate for alternative
sets of investment decisions. Or indeed whether they reverse attitudes between classes
of investment decisions.
The attitude a client adopts towards a particular investment decision or class of
investment decisions may well depend on how the client mentally constructs or
‘frames’ those decisions. Indeed a client may hold what appear to be mutually
contradictory attitudes and decision making heuristics towards different types of
investment choices. A client who is risk assertive when deciding on short-term
investments using windfall capital may be considerably more risk averse when
allocating life savings to long term investments such as superannuation investments
that will determine levels of retirement income.
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A change of frame reference may create reversals in risk attitudes. If the
financial planner believes that the client consistently adopts a particular ‘frame’ when
making investment decisions then the frames used in the question/response process
should conform to that heuristic. Alternatively, where there is no evidence of such
consistency, then an attempt may be required to get at the underlying ‘frame-free’ risk
attitude or tolerance of the respondent.

6.2 Industry standards?
The Financial Services Reform Act is a first step in requiring financial advisors
to take serious account of their client’s beliefs and attitudes when giving investment
advice. But the Act’s silence on risk attitude assessment requirements is problematic
for the financial services industry. Presumably, financial planners are under onus of
proof to demonstrate the legitimacy of their ‘reasonable enquiries’ process and
attitude/tolerance assessments. Damage suits for large potential losses based on
inappropriate advice or decisions may be hard to defend if a ‘reasonable person’ test
indicates that the professional financial planner should have known about framing
effects or had a duty of care to ensure process compliance with basic psychometric
principles.
The industry may need to assist its members to comply with the Act by
developing industry standards for risk attitude/tolerance assessment processes. The
complexity of the issues enhances the case for industry guidance to members. There is
an urgent need for a structured approach to development of industry standards on
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process requirements for concept valence, minimum compliance with psychometric
principles and control of response conditioning factors.
This urgency is enhanced by the upsurge of software based risk tolerance
profilers and risk attitude assessors which have the capacity to embed framing effects
across whole firms and groups of franchises if they are not made to conform to
minimum industry standards. Psychometric certification is significant. But it is not the
only, or indeed the most important, issue. A software profiler can be psychometrically
valid in terms of attitude measurement scales but still be both conceptually unsound
and practically dangerous if it ignores behavioral considerations such as decision
framing, attitude reversal and choice heuristics in asset allocation decisions.
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